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Photo by Barbara Zandoval on Unsplash[/caption]
The situation in Ukraine is turning into a protracted conflict with huge geopolitical, economic and social consequences for the whole world. Vladimir Putin cannot afford to lose, and it is unlikely that he will be made so. Hoping that he may be removed by Kremlin insiders or by a popular uprising is a pie in the sky. Those around Putin are actually worse hardliners than he is, and his approval rate among ordinary Russians is still high. His supporters are as fanatical, irrational and fatalistic as Trump’s supporters in the US (it should not come as a surprise that there is an affinity between Trump and Putin and, by extension, their supporters). Arming the Ukrainians seems to produce some results, but this can lead to a stalemate at best. The economic sanctions are unlikely to do the trick either. The ruble bounced back, and there are plenty of countries, such as India, that see this as an opportunity to get hold of badly needed energy supplies. These countries (as well as Russia itself) have been left high and dry by the West too many times in the past to have a sense of allegiance. Even if the economic and other pressures worked, it may not make things better, but worse – much worse. We may end up in a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions, threatening our very survival as a species. At the end of the cold war in the 1990s, we were very lucky that the last president of the Soviet Union was Michael Gorbachev, who would rather let the Soviet Union collapse than escalate the conflict with the West. This time, we may not be so lucky. Most likely, Putin would rather risk the destruction of the world than his personal defeat, and he is in a position to do so. And yet, the West cannot just back down and let him do whatever he likes in Ukraine, not just because of humanitarian reasons but also because that would only encourage Russia and other countries to make similar moves (e.g. China may attempt to take over Taiwan) till the next global war becomes an inevitability. The situation may seem hopeless, but it is not quite yet. We need a compromise that could be perceived as a win-win by everybody involved. This requires a radical solution that challenges the existing status quo: democratising borders may be just that.
State’s sovereignty or people’s sovereignty?
The role of the NATO expansion in leading to this crisis is well recognised, but there is something else that the West and NATO did, which precipitated the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the attempts to annex other Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine in 2022: NATO and the West made a precedent by a heavy bombardment of Serbia in 1999 (in contrivance to its own Article 5) and facilitating the secession of Kosovo from Serbia. It was incredible arrogance and short-sightedness to believe that others would not follow suit at the first opportunity. Merely half a year after Kosovo unilaterally declared independence in 2008, Russia assisted two Georgian regions with a predominantly Russian population to do the same. Crimea followed. With Kosovo, the sacrosanctity of countries’ territorial integrity was gone forever. This might not necessarily be a bad thing, though. It may be worth considering the people’s choice – carried out in a consistent and organised, rather than opportunistic and haphazard way – as an option not just in the case of Ukraine but also in other potential flashpoints throughout the world.
Throughout history, borders that define the territorial integrity of a country have been mostly carved out following wars or often-arbitrary decisions made by powers or political systems from bygone times. It is not surprising that borders have always been, and still are, a major source of conflicts, although at present, it is more often intra-national borders that cause troubles – namely, people in a particular region not wanting to remain in their country. Kosovo, Bosnia, Northern Ireland, the Basque Country, Catalonia, Kurdistan, Somalia, Yemen, Tibet, as well as Ukraine all have one issue in common: discontent about being forced to be a part of a country they don’t want to be. With certain conditions and caveats discussed below, all such conflicts could vanish if we democratise borders and prioritise people’s choices over territorial integrity.
Besides wars, there are essentially two ways of settling the issue of borders: enforcing existing ones, irrespective of who has drawn them, when and how, or deciding democratically on where they should run – in other words, letting the people who live there to choose. At the moment, the former is generally the rule, even though the way some borders were set would be a laughing matter if it were not a serious issue that has been the cause of much suffering. Let’s take two recent conflicts in Europe. The borders of the various republics in the former Yugoslavia were drawn up by Marshall Tito and his Communist Party after WW2. There were all sorts of political and other reasons why that establishment carved up the country in such a way (although it was never seriously considered that those federal units would one day aspire to become independent states). After the break-up of Yugoslavia, the Western powers decided that these communist-defined borders should be preserved intact at a time when communism itself had collapsed in Yugoslavia. If the wishes of the people had been taken into account, perhaps the wars, atrocities and ongoing instability in the region to this day could’ve been avoided.
The second example is Ukraine. On a whim, the communist leader of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, decided in 1964 to take Crimea from Russia and give it to Ukraine (again, he never thought that Ukraine would one day become a truly independent country). This change of borders, made by a regime that the West fought against and tried to discredit throughout the cold war, was nevertheless upheld when Ukraine emerged from the wreckage of the Soviet Union and suppressed Crimea’s move to independence in 1992. Of course, the same was the case in 2014 when Russia sent soldiers to Crimea and the region’s population, which consists mainly of ethnic Russians, after the upheaval in Ukraine that fuelled anti-Russian sentiment, voted in a referendum to join Russia (the legitimacy of the referendum may be questioned, but there is a little doubt that the vast majority of the inhabitants did not want Crimea to remain a part of Ukraine). It was the beginning of the conflict that culminated in the ongoing Russian invasion of the whole of Ukraine.
Outside Europe, things are even worse. Borders in Africa and the Middle East frequently look surreal. Unlike in Europe, they are often strength lines – created mainly by British bureaucrats whose most sophisticated tool at that time was the ruler and who really didn’t care about tribes, communities, cultures and the geographical features of those parts of the world and often divided them right down the middle. We can go on and on. So, why do the big powers still insist on preserving these borders, even when they are not fit for purpose?
Well, it’s mostly because they are scared of the alternative – letting those who live there choose. The tragic consequences of the partition between India and Pakistan made the world weary of such moves. Even more importantly, some countries are concerned that supporting a border change in one place might ignite an appetite for redefining borders in Europe and elsewhere. If we start redrawing borders, the reasoning goes, political chaos may ensue. So, millions of people are forced to live imprisoned within countries that they don’t want to be a part of in the name of stability. However, such a system is costly in many ways, and it does not deliver stability; in the best case, it only postpones conflicts. Tensions, rebellions, fights for independence, and outright wars crop up regularly – they erupt whenever and wherever the hands that hold the lead weaken.
We take the view that in the long term, the world would benefit from greater political unification – nationalism is a 19th-century relic that can be very destructive in modern society. However, we cannot get there in a straight line. Any group of people with a shared identity need a sense of self-determination – otherwise, discontent will only grow, festered by a fantasy that everything would be much better if only they could get away from the country they are part of at that point in time. It may be time to consider self-determination as an option, as it could indeed contribute to a more dynamically stable and peaceful world as well as better relationships between nation-states.
The conditions and caveats
There are many examples of peaceful separations and partitioning working. This is how the borders were created in Europe after the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and, to a large extent, in South America after its countries gained independence. An example, in more recent years, can be the split between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. However, there are historical examples of separations, such as that of India and Pakistan, that cost a lot of lives and didn’t resolve the tension between the countries; Sudan may be another example. Evidently, self-determination is not straightforward. This is not to say that separations should not be done, but to establish borders democratically without descending into a civil war we need to learn from past failures and successes. These two conditions are essential for such a readjustment of borders to be successful.
A separation must be truly a people’s decision: one of the problems in India was that the partition was rushed through and left to regional leaders, not to the people (as in the contested area of Kashmir). This created numerous problems, muss migrations, and lasting conflicts that have been barely contained but certainly not resolved to this day. The decision to separate or not must be made via a referendum in which all adult permanent residents of that region can participate – not a local government, leader or political party. Applied to the present situation in Ukraine, this would mean that disputed regions in the Eastern part of Ukraine should be allowed to have a referendum, monitored by international observers, in which the residents can decide if they want to stay in Ukraine, become independent or join another country (which it this case would most likely be Russian Federation). We do not propose, though, that the ‘winner takes it all’. If some parts within the breakaway region voted to remain in the country of origin, this should be
The borders of breakaway regions must be open to adjustments, too: when the Western powers supported the secession of Kosovo (with a predominately Albanian population) from Serbia, somewhat illogically, they did not allow some parts with a predominantly Serbian population to secede from Kosovo and remain in Serbia – instead, they were forced to go along with Kosovo’s secession even if they had no desire to do so. This is still the major issue and stabling block, which makes it virtually impossible to resolve the situation permanently and is the constant cause of tension in the region. We suggest that democratising borders must work both ways. If a region is allowed to separate following a referendum, that region must allow some of its parts that do not want to do so to remain in the country they are leaving. At first sight, this may look like a big logistical challenge, but in practice, it would actually be relatively easy to implement at not much extra cost, and it would be more effective than the alternative.
Some other factors need to be taken into account and, in some cases, may take precedence:
Geographical position: to avoid fragmentation, the part that wants to secede must be geographically connected rather than being isolated pockets that are completely surrounded by those areas that do not want to leave. In other words, such region(s) would have to be on the periphery of the country they want to leave and, if they aspire to join another country, to border with it.
Topography: in some cases, geographical factors need to be taken into account. For example, natural borders such as rivers may have to be prioritised to enable access to both sides. Similarly, if those who wish to leave may be stretched along the coastline, access to the sea may need to be secured to both sides. This may be a very relevant point in Ukraine.
History: in some cases, a congregation of groups with distinct identities from the rest of the country may be the result of relatively recent and sometimes forced immigration – and in the case of the Russian minority in Latvia that tripled during the Soviet occupation to about 25%. Of course, it would seem absurd to let them now carve out a part of Latvia and join Russia. There is a negligible danger that this could happen in any case, because there are very few areas in Latvia where the Russian-speaking population exceeds 50%, and it is highly unlikely that all those of Russian origin would ever vote to leave Latvia and join Russia. Still, such situations cannot be left to chance. Sometimes, historical factors must be taken into account.
Feasibility: if the principle of people’s sovereignty is taken on board, feasibility should not depend upon the willingness of the existing state to let go. However, a region that wishes to be independent would need to meet additional standards in an interim period, proving that it can fulfil all national and international obligations, such as creating functional political, economic and legal institutions, protecting the human rights of its citizens and the commitment to peaceful coexistence with its neighbours. Only then could it be recognised as a newly independent country. This all may not be necessary if a region wishes to join another country, but in that case, of course, that other country would need first to agree to accept it.
Why democratising borders might be an attractive option for all players in Ukraine
To resolve something peacefully and through negations, every side needs to feel that they are getting something in the end. It has to be a win-win situation in a way that gains are perceived as greater than losses. So, let’s spell out what each player in the case of Ukraine can gain if regional self-determination is on the cards:
Ukraine: Ukraine may lose Crimea and other smaller Russian-speaking parts, such as the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. However, the fact is that Ukraine will never have full (or more likely any) control over them anyway, and it will keep bleeding as long as they are just nominally its parts. Even if, somehow, in the future, it becomes capable of imposing the rule from Kyiv, it will likely have to do it by force – doing to the people in those parts what Russia is doing to them now. There is no way that, after all, that has happened, those regions would voluntarily consent to be part of Ukraine. These parts are, for all practical purposes, already lost. Accepting that (if confirmed in a referendum) Ukraine may get, in return, peace, hopes for closer ties with the EU and economic prosperity, as well as security guarantees. According to NATO’s purposes and principles of enlargement, territorial disputes must be resolved before a state is invited to join the Alliance. The above would remove this major stumbling block to Ukraine’s membership, which could then follow the Norwegian model – joining the Alliance without hosting NATO bases on its territory. President Zelensky has signalled that he might not be completely averse to such possibilities.
Russia may get a protectorate of the territories with an overwhelming Russian population, which was the main justification for its invasion. If coupled with assurances that Ukraine will not host NATO bases on its territory (Norwegian style), Putin can claim that he achieved the objectives. As this would also be a step toward Russian economic recovery, it may appear more attractive than destroying the whole world.
The West will be credited for securing peace and stability and avoiding Armageddon – without encouraging others to follow Putin’s steps (whatever the results of legitimate referendums in disputed regions would remove any excuses for an invasion). Note that this option would highlight a clear difference between Ukraine and Taiwan, for example. While some parts of Ukraine may want to voluntarily join the Russian Federation, a referendum in Taiwan would most likely indicate that its people would not want to voluntarily join China, making any excuses to do it by force vacuous.
Would the above give too much to Russia? After all, the Russian troops seem to have committed war crimes and brutally destroyed a number of towns and other places in Ukraine. Wouldn’t it be unjust, after all that, to allow people in certain parts of Ukraine to determine their future? Perusing justice and bringing those responsible to the account are, of course, important, but we need to separate conflict resolution and punishment. If they are convoluted, a resolution can only be reached if one side is a resolute winner, but this would necessitate a war. An all-out war. And in such a war, there would be no winners.
What we can do about it
Sending money to Ukraine and hosting or supporting the refugees are noble and worthwhile causes, but they are not going to resolve much. If the above option appears sound, there is more we can do for Ukraine and other troubled areas in the world. Here are a few suggestions:
- We can bring this possibility of resolving the seemingly intractable gridlock to the attention of politicians and other decision-makers in our countries.
- We can start or get involved in existing discussions and debates about democratising borders on social media in order to engage the general public and gain widespread support.
- We can engage with initiatives such as the International Boundaries Research Unit at the University of Durham, UK, the Association of Borderlands Studies based in North America, the African Borderlands Research Network (ABORNE) and border research centres at Nijmegen in the Netherlands and Queen’s University Belfast In Northern Ireland. These organisations are fertile ground for learning more about, sharing and advancing ideas related to this topic.
